Every proposal put forward has a common ingredient: an inexorable trend toward bigness. The U.S. government would reach for bigness in at least two ways. One is the merger of existing agencies and commissions, usually to be followed by conflation of the new larger agencies' jurisdictional reach. Second is the creation and empowerment of new über regulators, exercising 7 oversight over vast sectors of economic activity while perhaps further assuming some front-line responsibilities.
Thus far the SEC has escaped all of this. Early suggestions for a merger of the SEC with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) seem to have faded. Instead, led by SEC Chair Mary Schapiro, the Commission has 8 undertaken a number of new regulatory initiatives and tried to impart a new tone at the top, particularly in enforcement.
The purpose of this essay is to describe some of these developments, tease out the pros and cons of the march toward bigness, and to evaluate this overall trend. The conclusion? The principal problem is that the SEC has now become the last fire truck to arrive at the scene of the fire, when not too long ago it was leading the charge. Many times the SEC fire truck arrives at the fire not at all. Other times, it arrives, but late and behind the wheel of a dinky little fire truck, ill-equipped to extinguish the fire; limping along in this fashion, the Commission is disrespected further and even ignored by Wall Street, not to mention federal judges. Nothing in the trend toward bigness, and only admired by some, feared by many, and able once again to gain the confidence of the public and to project a level of deterrence that will put an end to the greed and recklessness that has characterized this decade?
I. THE PROPOSALS

A. The Proposed Paulson Reforms
Hank Paulson, former CEO of the large and highly profitable financial services firm Goldman Sachs, served as Secretary of the Treasury under President George W. Bush. In March 2008, Secretary Paulson fired the first salvo, publishing a white paper that promoted the Federal Reserve as an über regulator, "in effect allowing it to send SWAT teams into any corner of the industry or institution that might pose a risk to the overall system." The Bush 10 administration said that "the Federal Reserve should be given sweeping new powers to protect the integrity of the financial system, contending that market turmoil had exposed a badly outdated regulatory system." More recently, 11 Citigroup founder Sanford Weill floated a very similar proposal: "Make the Federal Reserve the super-regulator responsible for overseeing systemic risk. It is vital that one regulator be able to see the entire balance sheet of the country's largest financial institutions. . . . Large banks, securities firms, insurers and hedge funds should all come under the Fed's aegis."
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B. Ex-SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt's Views
Chairman Pitt took to the hustings in early 2009, offering views that the existing regulatory system is "badly broken" and that "an extensive overhaul is in order." According to the Chairman, repairing the regulatory system in 13 the area of finance is "critical and necessary." In 1998-99, when Congress had an opportunity to do so, Congress did not modernize the regulatory patchwork. In enacting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Congress rescinded the GlassSteagall Act, permitting commercial banks headlong entry into a financial arena occupied by investment banks; at the same time, though, Congress failed to fill in any of the crevices, such as regulation of new derivative products and synthetic derivatives, and in fact forbade the SEC to regulate in those areas.
14 As a result, while banks could offer one-stop shopping across a broad and expanding array of financial products and services, regulation remained a "patchwork" consisting of various agencies regulating various areas, with many areas not regulated at all. Chairman Pitt's guidelines for regulatory reform included:
• The SEC must revamp its compliance surveillance.
• Government must enhance its risk management capabilities in all financial areas.
• Government has to ensure that regulatory agencies have the authority and the responsibility to regulate all new financial products. The best way to achieve these aims? The President and the Congress should create an über regulator so that no cracks or crevices would exist any longer.
C. President Obama's Proposals
When they emerged, the Administration's proposals pulled the punch that had been anticipated. No merger of the SEC and other agencies, such as the CFTC, would occur. No full-blown über regulator would emerge. Instead, a front-line regulator, the Federal Reserve, would assume overall supervision, presumably including risk management, for large financial firms (Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies, or FHCs) of whatever stripe (commercial banks, investment banks, brokerage firms). The Office of Thrift Supervision 15 (formerly the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) would cease to exist, merging with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (an agency within Treasury which regulates national banks) to form the first of two partial über regulators (some über, some front-line responsibility), the National Bank Supervisor. A second partial über regulator, the Commercial Financial Protection Agency,
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16. The new "agency would monitor the fine print on such products as credit cards and mortgages. Such oversight is now scattered." Anne Flaherty, Geithner: Oversight in Need of Reform, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 25, 2009, at A7. Under the Obama proposal, the new agency would also dictate terms for "plain vanilla" versions of those items, such as 30-year mortgages and low-interest, low-fee credit cards. Republicans argued that such a legislative feature was "the first step toward having government bureaucrats approve and disapprove an array of products." The Obama proponents withdrew that feature of the proposed legislation. Labaton, supra note 6.
17 The SEC actually emerged with expanded powers, including recommendations that the SEC have power to impose fiduciary as well as suitability standards on brokers, serve as the conservator or receiver when the largest subsidiary of a failing financial firm is a broker-dealer or securities firm, and give expanded protection to whistle-blowers in the financial field. Matter-of-fact appraisals portrayed the Administration as "backing away from seeking a major reduction in the number of agencies overseeing the financial markets . . . . [ So the push for an über regulator, or at least one for banks, re-emerged. 23 All institutions, "wherever they're regulated," including "sectors of the financial system that have long fallen outside the scope of any agency," will come under one large banking agency. In the Congress, the über banking regulator's standard-bearer became Senator Christopher Dodd, who chairs the Senate Banking Committee and who introduced legislation to roll the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, FDIC, and Federal Reserve into one. Mr. Dodd says that "the market crisis last year was caused 24 in part by banks that were able to choose which agency would regulate them and by bank agencies that reduced regulations to encourage more banks to choose them." Über appeared to be becoming über once again. 25 The Dodd plan is likely to receive sharp resistance from banking industry lobbyists who wish to preserve as much of the current system as they can and with it the advantages for regulatory arbitrage, which at the extreme critics dub "the race for the bottom." The Dodd plan would provide for a consumer financial protection agency, as would the Obama plan, but would significantly reduce the Federal Reserve's role.
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E. Big on Big Proposals
Certain knowledgeable observers take these proposals several steps further, advocating bigness for bigness's sake. We need big tough regulators to take on the bigger, ofttimes incorrigible financial institutions, some of which have grown to gargantuan size:
[T]he assets of the nation's security brokers and dealers increased from $45 billion (1.6 percent of gross domestic product) in 1980 to $262 billion (4.5 percent of GDP) in 1990 to more than $3 trillion (22 percent of GDP) in 2007.
[B]ear Stearns saw its assets increase from about $37 billion in 1999 to nearly $400 billion at the start of 2007; and the behemoth Citigroup . . . grew its balance sheet from less than $700 billion at the start of 1999 to more than $2 trillion by 2007! The rise of massive institutions represented a profound change in our financial system and a powerful new source of systemic risk. Yet we didn't update our regulatory policies in response . . . .
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F. Chairman Frank Arrives on the Scene
Representative Barney Frank, as Chair of the House Financial Services Committee, has concentrated on the trading and regulation of derivative products. The Obama administration wanted all derivatives, which in the financial crisis resulted in the concentration rather than the hedging of risk, to be traded on an exchange or a recognized electronic trading platform. Financial institutions say that certain financial products are not widely traded enough to be on exchanges; many of these products are essential to the management of risk by these front-line firms. In response, Representative Frank has written legislation softening the mandate that products be standardized and traded on exchanges. Officials at the SEC and the CFTC 
G. International Developments
The European Union Commission has completed draft legislation that would provide for a pan-European über regulator. The European Systemic Risk Board would be charged with detection of risks in the financial systems of 27 countries, issuing warnings and prescriptions for corrective actions. 29 G-20 leaders discussed "how to get banks to fatten their capital cushions and limit leverage of that capital," seemingly sounding a prelude for yet another über regulator proposal.
II. ON BIGNESS
A. Progress
Thus far, proposals for a hydra-headed über regulator have made little progress. This has led to reports of tantrums by the Treasury Secretary: "Secretary Timothy Geithner blasted top U.S. financial regulators in an expletive-laced critique last Friday as frustration grows over the Obama administration's faltering plan to overhaul U.S. financial regulation . . . ."
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What seems to hamstring the proposals' progress is the difficulty of reaching around them or, indeed, even around several of the regulatory agencies being proposed. In that sense, "big" may be a disadvantage. 
B. The Advantages of Big
Meet Force with like Force: Big Institutions Need Big Powerful Regulators
A global trend exists toward bigness. Multinational corporations strive to be number one, two or perhaps three in their core competencies, not on a regional, national or pan-national (European Union or similar) scale, but on a global basis. The Microsoft antitrust case is instructive. Microsoft used its 32 monopoly over the basic operating system (Windows) to force original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to install Microsoft's web browser, Explorer, rather than the first widely used browser by Netscape. Often using bare knuckles, Microsoft rapidly went from 3 to 97 percent domestic market share.
For an antitrust violation to exist, the would-be violator must have a monopoly on the tying product, here the basic system. Whether they have a monopoly depends upon how the relevant geographic market is defined. If the market is only a national one (300 million persons), Microsoft probably engaged in an illicit practice. On the other hand, if the market is a global one 33 (6.3 billion persons), Microsoft must engage in some of these practices if it is to compete on the world stage. "Think Global," "Get Big Fast," "The Earth Is Flat." Why should regulatory agencies be any different?
With Big Über Regulators, Gaps or Crevices No Longer Exist, So Opportunities for Regulatory Arbitrage Are Minimized, or Eliminated Altogether
With one big regulator over commercial and investment banks, "[i]nstitutions aren't going to be able to play one regulator off against another the way they have in the past." In fact, certain of the players, such as which is a smaller agency yet, has a reputation for having high levels of morale and fervor.
In all of this quest for reform, no person in authority has raised even the possibility that mergers and the formation of an über regulator may entail lasting and significant intangible costs in terms of loss of spirit and morale.
Big Regulators Produce Large Quantities of Vapid and Turgid "Bloat"
The SEC is already infected with this problem. In days of yore, as a small and efficient agency, the Commission promulgated three and five-page releases. They left numerous "fruitful ambiguities," to be worked out over time, or not worked out at all.
Things have changed. One recent release, on possible adoption of a modified uptick rule applicable to short selling, contained 243 pages, replete with 266 footnotes. A follow-on release, requiring broker-dealers to close 42 fails to deliver, mainly by short-selling clients, had 100 pages. Following 43 adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which required that at least one member of a public company's audit committee be a "financial expert," the SEC devoted a 63-page release to this relatively simple topic, when two or three pages surely would have sufficed. In lengthening its pronouncements, the 44 SEC is substituting plain ambiguity for fruitful ambiguity, largely a counterproductive effort. Much more of the same will come with big über regulators.
Existence off Big Über Regulators Will Conflate the Expectations Gap, Already Too Big as it Is
Politicians today do not stand up and declare that government cannot solve this problem, or that problem, or all problems. They lead the citizenry to believe that government can be all things to all people. So do regulators. So does the mere existence of large and, inferentially, all-powerful regulatory agencies. Among the myriad proposals for über regulators in the financial 45 area, "[t]he biggest danger of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency is . . . that giving products a government imprimatur can make people feel safer than they really are. (The economist Kip Viscusi has termed this type of problem the 'lulling effect.')." But it is worse than that. Instead of lulling, the creation 46 of a big, supposedly all-powerful agency creates affirmative expectations that government can bail anyone out of almost any problem. Rather than a new regulator, "it would do well to teach consumers a simple lesson: if you don't understand the deal you're making, don't make it. included the SEC. Instead, "[t]he Securities and Exchange Commission clearly has the Administration's confidence and appears a winner in the opening phase of the financial services regulatory reorganization," one commentator said as a prelude to his observations. He continued: "[t]he Treasury proposal now praises the SEC as 'an experienced federal supervisor' and . . . assigns it substantial new responsibilities." Thus, for the time being, the SEC can put 50 back into the closet the prospect of an über regulator towering over or absorbing the Commission. Accordingly, the time has come to examine closely the assignment to the Commission of "substantial new responsibilities" as well as the refurbishment of some old ones.
B. Initiatives by or for the SEC
The Obama administration wants all standardized derivatives to be traded on exchanges or cleared through the mechanisms of electronic trading platforms where they would be subject to robust margin and record-keeping requirements. Presently, such transactions often go unreported, even to the 51 extent of taking place in back rooms. As part of the Administration's proposals, the Treasury wants to require that hedge funds and private equity firms register with the SEC pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act. Closer 52 to enforcement, the proposed Treasury reforms would require the classification of registered representatives as fiduciaries in all cases, not merely when the broker had held herself out as being such. The SEC could 53 in effect (by a four out of five commissioner vote) put broker-dealer subsidiaries of large financial firms into involuntary "resolution" proceedings in which the SEC would be the conservator or receiver. Another plank in the 54 new platform would involve revoking the 10-day rule, under which brokerdealers could vote "street name" shares if beneficial owners had failed to vote, in part on the grounds that brokers never properly analyzed the issues, blindly reforms would widen and deepen SEC jurisdiction but they only impinge upon enforcement. Strictly speaking, these reforms would be adjuncts to enforcement rather than enforcement itself.
C. Reforms to Bring Back "A Sense of Urgency" to SEC Enforcement
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SEC Chair Mary Schapiro wants to put in place a number of measures that will make the agency's enforcement staff "more fleet-footed." Steps the 57 SEC has taken or proposes to take include the following: (including "pay-to-play" allegations).
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Allocation of staff to preexisting teams, with resources pre-allocated to them, will make for much quicker response times. These then are certain of the actions taken or proposed to make the SEC quicker on its feet, able to react, and even be proactive in a greater number of cases and matters. They are all laudatory. Many go to reducing reaction time, which had become sclerotic under previous administrations, with restraints placed on enforcement as matters of political expediency. But do they attempt resolution, head-on, of the principal ailment which bedevils securities law enforcement?
IV. THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM AND EVIDENCE OF IT
A view widely held is that SEC enforcement peaked in the Shad/Ruder/Breeden era of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Statistics, which 67 abound and seem to signal renewed vigor at enforcement, do not tell the real story. That story is that since the early 1990s SEC enforcement has lost 68 much or, indeed, most of its in terrorem (deterrent) effect. Short of a broadbased attitudinal study, and perhaps not even then, direct evidence cannot be gathered.
Indirect evidence, however, is plentiful. The evidence shows that in this new century major securities scandals unfold each and every year, sometimes two or three times per year. This never happened in the Twentieth Century. There seems to be no effective curb on greed, indeed, unbridled greed. Some of those scandals, and the reactions to them, include:
• The late-day trading and stale price arbitrage scandals of the mutual fund industry. These abuses involved investment companies allowing favored investors, many of which were hedge funds, to enter buy and sell orders after computation of the net asset value (NAV) and the close of business each day. . 2007 ), describes backdating, a practice through which corporate officers backdated stock options to a date on which the market price was significantly lower so that the exercise or "strike" price would be lower and the profits correspondingly higher when corporate officers, principally CEOs, exercised those options. In re Tyson Foods, Inc., Consol. S'holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 572 (Del. Ch. 2007), describes spring loading, a practice through which stock option committees time the grant of options to corporate executives-typically, before public announcements of positive developments likely to result in significant increases in the price of the underlying stock. Bulletdodging occurs when those in control, sensing that the market has overreacted to negative news and unduly depressed the company's share price, quickly grant options to corporate executives, who thereafter have an inordinately low strike price for the options. Rakoff and the national media publicly called the SEC to account, further highlighting the SEC's failures. 76 • The never-ending parade of Ponzi schemes, each seemingly larger than the last. Bernard Madoff stole approximately $15 billion (not the $65 billion the press has fixated upon) from his investment adviser clients. Over the years, the SEC received at least six tips 77 that Madoff could not have achieved the financial results he claimed to have achieved or that he must have in some way been engaged in a fraudulent scheme. Yet the SEC did nothing. Charitably, the SEC staff's failures are understandable. That anyone, and in particular former NASDAQ president Bernard Madoff, could have pulled off such a large fraud stretching over so many years, is far-fetched; and, indeed, it is equally far-fetched that he wouldn't have been caught, if not by the SEC, then another regulator or even a client. That no one caught Madoff at his game is, among other things, testimony not only to gullibility but also to affinity fraud.
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Other large far-fetched schemes also had come to light before the SEC had demonstrated even an inkling. R. Allen Stanford ran a high yield investment business that garnered over $7 billion in investors' capital. Neither the SEC nor the applicable self-regulatory Not only has the SEC failed to detect or heed warnings and tips about many of these Ponzi schemes, the Commission and its staff have permitted other, lesser regulators to steal a march on the SEC in prosecuting those responsible for these massive frauds. A 80 chronicler of the Madoff episode describes recent years as "one of the most dysfunctional and inept periods in the Commission's history." 81 • The newest investment scandals: the pay-to-play allegations.
CalPERS, the largest public employee pension plan, paid $50 million to a middleman (also a former director) to funnel investment proposals to it. These allegations shed further light on the practices 82 of an industry previously in the netherworld, which earned lucrative fees for presenting investment opportunities to hedge funds, private equity firms, and pension plans such as CalPERS. Once again, the SEC was not among the first of the fire trucks to arrive at the scene. Andrew Cuomo, the Attorney General of New York, prosecuted the first cases, not the SEC. 83 
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC is moving in the correct direction. By flattening its organizational structure, eliminating middle management layers, and pushing authority down to or toward the front lines, the agency is making itself fleetfooted, imparting a sense of increased urgency to its enforcement effort. With proposals for a chief operating officer (COO), the Commission may come more to replicate the management structure of many large business
